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The Conclusion of International Agreements
by International Organizations: A

Functional Analysis Applied
to the Agreements of the
World Meteorological
Organization
Delbert D. Smith*
The conclusion of international agreements by international organizations may well prove to be one of the most significant treaty forms
of the 1970s. Particularly with regard to scientifically oriented international organizations, this treaty making ability may have implications for the direction and formation of both domestic and international law. The World Meteorological Organization, as such an
international body, provides a relevant context within which to consider this treaty-making capability.
The functions and scope of activities of the World Meteorological
Organization require it to enter into a wide variety of international
and other agreements with intergovernmental bodies and with nongovermental international organizations. Many of these agreements
have a significant impact on the international scientific community and
many of them partially determine the direction that scientific investigation will take in a particular field. As a scientific agency, the WMO
will be called upon to conclude a number of significant agreements in
the future dealing with satellite meteorology and the global observa*
Legal Advisor, Space Science and Engineering Center, and Director, The
EDSAT Center, University of Wisconsin. Member, the Wisconsin Bar.

Loyola University Law Journal

Vol. 2: 27

tions of the weather. Therefore it becomes significant for the legal
community to be aware of the treaty making capacity of international
organizations and particularly the WMO, and this awareness can best
be created through an examination of the legal ramifications of the
agreements that this body concludes. Since the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties does not include consideration of the treatymaking capacity of the international organizations, the laws dealing with
the agreements concluded by the WMO are not as yet codified, and a
functional analysis of this capacity takes on added significance.
This article first considers the criteria for establishing the international status of the WMO and for determining the validity of its international agreements. It then discusses the ability of the WMO to
conclude international agreements and follows this with a functional
analysis of the existing agreements that have been concluded with an
emphasis on the international legal implications of these undertakings.
Finally, an assessment is offered as to the legal significance of this
treaty-making capacity.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The lack of codification regarding the conclusion of international
agreements by international organizations creates an area of international law which is lacking in definiteness. The importance of treaties
as a source of international law is stressed by the Preamble to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties' which affirms the fact that treaty
disputes should be settled by peaceful means and in conformity with
the principles of justice and international law and further states in
part:
Believing that the codification and progressive development of the
law of treaties achieved in the present Convention will promote the
purposes of the United Nations set forth in the Charter, namely,
the maintenance of international peace and security, the development of friendly relations and the achievement of cooperation
among nations ....2
However, the Convention then goes on to state in Article 1 that the present Convention applies only to treaties between States. The term
"treaty" is defined as ". . . an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether
1. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N.G.A. A/CONF. 39/27, 23
May 1969, United Nationn Conference on the Law of Treaties.
2. Id. at 1 (Preamble).
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embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments
and whatever its particular designation;"' Article 3 of the Convention
specifically states that the present Convention does not apply to international agreements concluded between States and other subjects of international law or to those concluded between such other subjects of international law.4 Finally, Article 6 states only "Every State possesses
capacity to conclude treaties." 5
In fact, earlier versions of the Convention had contained reference
to international organizations, but these were later discarded in favor
of the final version which excluded these organizations. An early
draft of the International Law Commission referred in Article 2 to "an
agreement in written form governed by international law and concluded between two or more States or other subjects of international
law, possessed of treaty-making capacity."
More precisely, the June
1962 draft articles stated in Article 3(1) that "capacity to conclude
treaties under international law is possessed by States and by other
subjects of internationallaw."7 The relevant Commentary verified that
the reference to "other subjects" referred to international organizations.
An ambiguous situation was created, however, because in Article 5(3)
it was stated that "in the case of international organizations, capacity to
conclude treaties depends on the constitution of the organization concemed."
The Commentary then stated that the capacity did not depend exclusively on the constituent instrument terms but it also depended on the decisions and rules of the competent organ of the organization. Thus, it would have appeared that an organization could
promulgate a rule to the effect that it could conclude international
agreements which would have been satisfactory. One clarifying suggestion would have resulted in a revision of Article 3(1) which would
have read "Capacity to conclude treaties under international law is
possessed by States, intergovernmental organizations, the Holy See and
other sovereign communities."9
3.

4.

Id. at Art. 2, Para. 1(a).
Id. at Art. 3.

Article 5 provides only that "The present Convention applies to

any treaty which is the constituent instrument of an international organization and to
any treaty adopted within an international organization without prejudice to any
relevant rules of the organization."

5.

Id. at Art. 6.

6.

Report of the International Law Commission covering the work of the Eleventh

Session (A/4169) (1959).

7. Report of the I.L.C. covering the work of the Fourteenth Session, ORGA
XVII, Supp. No. 9 and 7. (Emphasis added.)
8. Ibid.

9.

F. Seyersted.

"International Personality of Intergovernmental Organizations,"

4 Indian . Int'l L. 2, 58 n.201 (1964).
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While it is hoped that a codification of the Law of Treaties regarding international organizations will be developed and agreed upon in
the future, it is nevertheless imperative to be concerned with the problem at the present time given the immediacy of the global meteorological observing programs and since
Treaties to which international organizations are parties have
now become a common form for organizations to establish relations, or to create rights and duties, under international law. 10
It is further evident that "[N]ow that this network of international
organizations has in fact come into existence, other developments of
varying significance in the law of treaties must naturally follow.""
Given the reality of the conclusion of international agreements by the
WMO, it becomes necessary to determine whether this body can be
considered as an international organization for purposes of legal analysis.
II.

THE

WMO As AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

A primary task of interpretation involves the definition of the term
"international organization." It is proposed that the following criteria
be accepted as determining the existence of such an organization:
A. The organization must 12
be established by two or more States or
sovereign communities.
B. The organization must not be subject to the authority of any
other organized community except that of the participating
communities acting jointly through their representatives on
such organization.
C. The organization must not be authorized only to assume obligations on behalf of the several participating communities.' 3
The organizations that fall within the above criteria are suggested
to have the legal capacity to conclude international agreements, 1 4 subject to the limitations discussed in the following section. Assuming
compliance with the above criteria, the definition of "international organization" should be considered to include the term "intergovern10.

H. CmIu.

TREATIES,

(1966).

THE CAPACITY OF INTERNATIONAL
AND THE SPECIAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE

ORGANIZATIONS TO CONCLUDE
TREATIES SO CONCLUDED. 210

11. C. Parry, "The Treaty-Making Power of the United Nations." 26 Brit. Y.B.
Int'l L. 108, 149 (1949).
12. On the further definition of sovereign community, see Seyersted, supra note 9
at 19, 42, 61 and 66.
13. Id. at 66.
14. The term "international agreement" is used as a generic term to include
treaties, conventions, declarations, protocols, acts, etc. See A. McNAIR, THE LAW OF
TREATIES 6 (2nd ed. 1961).
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mental organization" as a specific type of organization because while
the majority of organizations that conclude international agreements are
intergovernmental in character it is possible that their membership
may be divided into categories and include units other than governmental units. For all practical purposes "international organization"
can be equated with "intergovernmental organization," since the two
phrases find synonymous usage in Article 2 para. (1)(i) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties which states: "international organization" means an intergovernmental organization." It is apparent
that the WMO fulfills the above requirements since it was established
by a large number of States, it is not subject to the authority of any
community except its participating members, and it can assume obligations in its own right and not solely on behalf of its participating members. Once the determination is made that the WMO fulfills the above
criteria, it then becomes necessary to consider the limitations to be imposed on it regarding its capacity to conclude international agreements.
III.

THE CRITERIA TO BE USED TO DETERMINE THE ABILITY

OF THE WMO TO CONCLUDE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

As was suggested by one version of the draft articles of the law of
treaties, it is possible to look only to the constitutive document of an
international organization to determine whether it has the capacity to
conclude international agreements. Given the imprecise nature of the
majority of these documents and the fact that most framers of these
documents did not consider the implications of their actions in terms of
the treaty-making capability, this would appear to be too mechanical
an approach. It is possible to consider the converse proposition to the
effect that the constitution of an international organization ".

.

. has at

most a negative effect, insofar as its provisions may limit the international personality which the Organization otherwise has under general international law, by authorizing it to commit its 'Member' States alone, by
limiting its purposes or by other provisions insofar as these have external effect."'"
It is suggested, however, that neither of these approaches is conclusive although the latter one may be considered as an
adjunct to the approach which is suggested to be the most desirablethat of considering the purposes and functions of the organization in
light of the general goals of international law to be sustained.
15.
16.

Vienna Convention supra note 1 at Art. 2, para. (1)(i).
Seyersted, supra note 9 at 68.
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Whereas a State possesses the totality of international rights and
duties recognized by international law, the rights and duties of an
entity such as the Organization [The United Nations] must depend
upon its purposes and functions as specified 17
or implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice.
To the same extent that international capacity was necessary for
the United Nations to achieve the purposes and principles of its Charter
-and this is not to say that it is a State-so too should the United Nations specialized agencies such as the WMO be treated in a like fashion.
The reference points should be the constitution of the organization and
the capacity that can be implied from the constitutent documents and
developed from the practice of the organization. As D. W. Bowett
indicates, the test to be developed must be a functional one,' 8 and if
such a test is decided upon, a further division can be made as to original
and derivative functions or primary and secondary functions. 19
The observation made by the International Law Commission to the
effect that while all entities having treaty-making capacity have international personality, all international persons do not necessarily have
a treaty-making capacity,2" indicates that international personality must
be specifically defined not only to include a vague reference to rights
and duties but to specify whether the treaty-making capacity is to be
included among them. Having rejected the test of "express provision,"'"
it remains to substantiate the validity of the "alternative competence"
test as it is elaborated in the utilization of determinative critiera.
The ability of an international organization to conclude international agreements should be based on one or more of the following:
A. The existence of express provisions found in the constitutive
document.
B. The necessary implications arising from the competence required to enable the organization to function effectively.
C. The expectations and intentions of the representatives of the
organizations when concluding the agreement.
17. The Reparations Case (1949), I.C.J. 180. (Emphasis added.) For reference
to this case in light of the law of treaties, see H. Lauterpacht, Report on the Law of
Treaties, I.L.C. Fifth Sess., A CN.4/63, 24 March 1953, UNGA. The limitations
suggested by Lauterpacht referred to the purposes and to the constitution of the organization, and that the basic standard was to be found in the Reparations Case.
He further argued that the rationale of this case applied to international organizations
with purposes less comprehensive than the United Nations.
18. D. W. BOWETT. THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, 265 (1963).
19. G. WEISSBERG. THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE UN, 330 (1950).
20. Report of the I.L.C. covering the work of the Eleventh Session, p. 10, para.
8(a) [A/4169, 19591.
21. See H. KELSEN, LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 330 (1950).
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Category (A) is self-explanatory, and if an express provision is found
it will be unnecessary to consider either the second or third category.
A determination of the "necessary implications" of category (B) requires a subjective analysis of the goals and purposes of the organization.
One solution to the interpretive difficulties raised by category (B)
would be to have the organization-if it possessed the right to request an advisory opinion from the I.C.J.-to get an opinion on a draft
treaty before the organization became bound by it. 2 1 Another way in
which to interpret category (B) would be to formulate the proposition
that inherent capacities should determine the limits of action. By this
it is meant that the legal capacity of an international organization to
conclude treaties based on an implied power would depend first on
whether any acts were specifically precluded by the Constitution of the
organization. 23 If the Constitution did not define the areas of competence of the Organization, then an extremely broad power would theoretically exist, even though in practice most constitutions generally delimit the scope of competence of the organization.2 4 The other limiting
factor would be the existence of an exhaustive enumeration of the acts
that the organization could perform.
A functional approach would also provide a means of countering
arguments put forward by some States to the effect that international
organizations should not be endowed with any treaty-making power
by emphasizing the needs of the organizations:
Opposition of States to the conclusion of a considerable number of
agreements between organizations does not immediately affect
the treaty-making power of the latter but should be considered as a
mainly political question, as long as States fail to equip organiza25
tions with means more harmoniously adapted to their needs.
To the extent that State exceptions to the treaty-making power of an international organization can be considered political in nature, it might
22. See note 18, supra at 279.
23. See Seyersted, supra note 9 at 55.
24. It is Schneider's view that the treaty-making power of an international organization cannot be completely traced back to its constitution and that this power should
be restricted to the extent of the competence of the organization. J. SCHNEIDER,
POWER OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATrOtS 135 (1959).
TREATY-MAKIN'
25. Id. at 141, 142. Schneider further states that:
We think that treaty-making power is conferred upon organizations on the
strength of rules of general international law and that such treaty-making
power is, therefore, generally applicable to organizations and should be recognized by States and other organizations.
Id. at 135.
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also be possible to argue that this type of argument can be excluded from
an analysis of the legal base for such a power.
The functional approach is given further credence when one considers that many international organizations have formulated their constituent documents in terms of purposes and functions rather than in
terms of legal authority or precise powers. It is on this point that Kelsen's approach evidences a substantial weakness. Kelsen argues that
the capacity of an international organization to conclude treaties must
be expressly stated in its constitutent instrument and that:
. . .if the constituent treaty does not contain a provision conferring
expressly upon the community international juridical personality,
that is to say unrestricted legal capacity under international law,
the community has only those special capacities as [are] conferred
upon it by particular provisions. This is of practical importance
for the legal capacity of concluding treaties ....26
Despite the fact that, with reference to the United Nations, this analysis
is found to be contrary to practice, it can be further stated that making
the treaty-making capacity (in cases where unlimited capacity is not
granted by the constituent instrument) dependent on specific constitutional provisions does not take into consideration the observation made
above as to the general nature of the constitutional provisions of international organizations. One of the tenets of the Reparations Case was
that the acts of entrusting certain functions to the United Nations "...
have clothed it with the competence required to enable those functions to
be effectively discharged. '2 7 Bowett states the preferred view most
concisely:
Whether or not any given international organization has treatymaking power can only be determined by reference to the constitution of the organization. This is not to adopt the somewhat narrow
view of Kelsen to the effect that such treaty-making power must be
expressly given; but rather to state that such power must be conferred expressly or by necessary implication as a competence required to enable the organization to discharge its junctions effec28
tively.
26. See note 21, supra at 329, 30.
27. [1949] I.C.J. 179. Similarly, the opinion stated:
Under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided for in the Charter, are conferred
upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its
duties.
Id. at 182.

28. See note 18, supra at 278. This view is in accordance with the statement
found in the ReparationsCase to the effect that
Throughout its history, the development of international law has been in-
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The need in this area is to find the most appropriate and effective
ways of furthering the important work of international organizations
and particularly the specialized agencies of the United Nations such
as the WMO. As Jenks states, "The practice of giving powers of decision to international bodies can only be developed by building up
precedents adapted to the political and technical context of particular
problems."29
IV.

THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CRITERIA CONCERNING THE

CONCLUSION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO THE WMO

It remains to examine whether the criteria established in the three
categories for a functional determination of the capacity of the WMO
to conclude international agreements are effective in practice. To that
end, the development of the purposes and functions of the WMO will
be considered, and the WMO competence to conclude international
agreements will be analyzed along with a discussion of the full power
question.
The Development of Purposes and Functions: The IMO, the 1947
Conference, and the Transfer Agreement
The need for cooperative effort in the areas of meteorology predated any concern with formal legal structure, and the first organizational plan consisted of meetings between the directors of the European
meteorological services. Following such a meeting in Leipzig in 1872,
it was decided to develop a permanent organizational structure, and at
a meeting in Vienna the following year plans were made which resulted in the establishment of a Permanent Committee.
At a subsequent meeting in Utrecht in 1878, the Permanent Committee drew up a constitution which was endorsed by the Rome Congress in 1879, which created the International Meteorological Organization (IMO). ° This body was governed by statutes adopted in 1919
which were revised at subsequent times. The major organs were:
(1) the Conference of Directors, (2) the International Meteorological
fluenced by the requirements of international life, and the progressive in-

crease in the collective activities of States has already given rise to instances of
action upon the interational plane by certain entities which are not States.
Reparations Case, supra note 27 at 178.

29.

C. Jenks, "Some Constitutional Problems of International Organizations," 22

Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 11, 47 (1945).
30. See generally the League of Nations, Handbook of International Organizations,
140-2; 151 (1938). See also 26 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 494, 5 (1949).
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Committee, and (3) a permanent Secretariat. 31 In addition to these
three primary bodies, there were also various technical commissions32
and subcommissions that provided work for the Committee. Among
these, the Commission for Aeronautical Meteorology was a major body,
as was the International Commission for Maritime Meteorology (established in 1907 and revived in 1919) and the Aerological Commission
(appointed in 1919).
While the second World War caused the suspension of the meteorological activities of the Organization, it also created a renewed interest
in the subject since aviation was found to increase the possibilities for
the utilization of meteorology by various governments. Following the
war there were increased efforts at technological development and international cooperation which led to the desire for an "official" organization in the area. The idea was proposed and a Convention drafted
at the 12th Conference of Directors held at Washington in September,
1947 which resulted in the creation of the World Meteorological Or33
ganization.
It was generally agreed at this Conference that the new organization had to have intergovernmental status, and the point was made by
the Chief of the United States Weather Bureau who was the head of the
U.S. Delegation that ". . . an intergovernmental status was essential to
31. The structure of these bodies was as follows:
The Conference of Directors: This was the periodic plenary organ and consisted of the directors of the several autonomous meteorological services of the
major nations of the world including various colonies. It met, in principle, every six years.
The International Meteorological Committee: This body consisted of the
representatives of twenty-six nations or territories. It also contained an Executive Council which consisted of the Chairman and six representatives from
the Committee. The Committee met at three year intervals.
The Permanent Secretariat: This body performed the usual functions expected of the Secretariat of an international organization and bad its seat in
De Bilt, The Netherlands.
32. Other Commissions included those on Bibliography and Publications, Climatology, Radio-atmospherics, the Study of Clouds, Agricultural Meteorology, Terrestrial Magnetism and Atmospheric Electricity, Map Projections, Polar Meteorology,
Solar Radiation, and Synoptic Weather Information. There were also regional Commissions established for Africa, the Far East, South America, and three others.
There was also a Special Committee for the Polar Year 1932-3, set up in Copenhagen
in 1929, which provided for cooperative efforts with the International Union for
Geodesy and Geophysics and other scientific bodies.
33. See the Final Act of the Washington Conference of Directors and of the
Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. June, 1948, Cmd. 7427. See
also, "Extraordinary Conference of Directors," Paris, 15 Mar.-17 Mar. 1951, Final
Report, IMO, Publication No. 81 (1952): "Conference of Directors, Washington, 22
Sept. - 11 Oct. 1947," Int. Meteorological Committee, Session in Washington, 11 Oct.
1947, Final Report, IMO Publication No. 71 (1949). The U.S. Government was the
official host through the intermediary of the U.S. State Dept., Division of Int. Conf.
and the U.S. Weather Bureau.

1971

Agreements by International Organizations

assure to a world meteorological organization the prestige it deserved in
How.""
its relationships to other intergovernmental organizations.
ever, while intergovernmental status was thought important, the Conference itself had a scientific scope that went beyond the usual format
of governmental delegates participating in an international meeting for
which they did not necessarily have the subject matter competence but
were acting as the representatives of their respective governments.
There was a dichotomy evidenced between the meteorological directors,
members of a nongovernmental technical organization-the IMOwhose concern was the drafting of meteorological regulations, and the
plenipotentiaries whose function at the Conference was to conclude an
international convention under which an intergovernmental organization designated as a specialized agency of the United Nations could be
established. The major argument against the creation of the WMO
was that there would be a loss of autonomy of membership and an increased concern over international political matters that might interfere with the essentially scientific purposes of the organization.
A further indication of the separation between the scientific activities and the concern with the content of the constitutive document
was the technical meeting held in Toronto by the technical commissions of the IMO just prior to the 1947 Conference. At this meeting,
405 technical resolutions were promulgated which were later consolidated into 220 resolutions, an agreement was concluded between the
M40 and ICAO on standard procedures and reporting for aeronautical
meteorology, and numerous other agreements were reached by the participants. 35 This separation would indicate that a liberal interpretation
of the constitutive document of the WMO ought to prevail in order
to facilitate scientific progress in the absence of specific indications of
a desire to limit the functions of the organization regarding the capacity to enter into international agreements.
Agreement was reached pertaining to the continued operation of
the IMO during the period of the creation of the WMO, since there was
a desire to ensure continuity in the world-wide cooperation in meteorological services. The emphasis was put on the continuity of the scientific service and not on the formulation of the correct formula for
34. J. Cates, "Meeting of International Meteorological Organization: Conference
of Directors," 18 Dept. of State Bull. 43, 44 (1948).
35. These agreements concerned such subjects as: the adoption of a universal code
of symbols for describing meteorological conditions; projects which would study climatology and the effect of weather conditions on crops; and a hydrographical study
concentrating on the forecasting of flood conditions.
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ensuring effective organizational succession. The actual transfer between the International Meteorological Organization and the World
Meteorological Organization took the form of two parallel resolutions.
The first was adopted by the Conference of Directors of the IMO on
March 17, 1951,86 and the second was adopted by the First Congress
of the WMO also in March of 1951.87 It is apparent that conscious
consideration was given to whether the wording of the two resolutions
should be the same,8 8 and that the expectations of the parties were to
the effect that they were in this way creating an international agree39
ment.
The Purposesand Functions of the WMO
The major goals of the World Meteorological Organization are to
coordinate, standardize, and improve world meteorological activities,
and to encourage the efficient exchange of meteorological information
between countries in the aid of human activities. Put more precisely,
the purposes of the Organization are:
(1) To facilitate world-wide co-operation in the establishment of
networks of stations for the making of meteorological observations or other geophysical observations related to meteorology, and to promote the establishment and maintenance of
meteorological centers charged with the provision of meteorological services;
(2) To promote the establishment and maintenance of systems
for the rapid exchange of meteorological information;
(3) To promote standardization of meteorological observations
and to ensure the uniform publication of observations and
statistics;
(4) To further the application of meteorology to aviation, shipping,
water problems, agriculture and other human activities; and
(5) To encourage research and training in meteorology and to
36. IMO Res. No. 32 (CD Paris 1951) Cited in WMO Doc. 1/I, at 1 (1953).
37. WMO Res. 3(1), First Cong. of WMO, 19 Mar.-28 April, 1951, Final Report,
Vol. I, Res., at 1 (Geneva, 1953), WMO Doc. 1/I (1953):

Article 26(c) of the WMO Convention provides for the taking over of the

functions of any other international agency with the transfer taking place by
international agreement or by some other mutually acceptable arrangement.
38. First Cong. of the WMO, Final Report, Vol. II, Proceedings, at 69-74, WMO
Doc. 1/II.R.C. 1 (1953).

39.

One writer also concludes that this was an international agreement:

The author of this book is of the opinion that the parallel resolutions cited in

examples given before are in the nature of agreements in simplified form,
because they effected a legal transaction between international organization

(sic).
Chiu, supra note 10 at 63.
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assist in co-ordinating
the international aspects of such re40
search and training.
Membership is open to the States represented in Annex I of the Convention, United Nations Members, and States that do not belong to the
UN providing certain procedures are followed. 4' Territories or groups
of territories that maintain their own meteorological services are also
included, 4 and there is provision made for non-self-governing territories or groups of territories that are dependencies of States represented in Annex I." Trust territories of the United Nations maintaining their own meteorlogical services can be directly administered by the
UN,A but all other States, territories, or groups of territories had to
have the approval of a two-thirds majority of the States Members of the
Organization for admission.45 The implication of these provisions is
that there is now a political base for membership in the Organization
even though it remains essentially scientific in character.
A relevant Convention provision regarding voting states that only
Members which are States are entitled to vote regarding, among other
subjects, the "relations with the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations." '4 6 This provision is significant because it indicates the attempt made to comply with international law by limiting the
privilege in this matter so there would be no doubt as to the status
of the organization as fulfilling the criteria of being considered an international organization with the capacity to enter into international
agreements.4 7
The organizational structure of the WMO consists of the World
40. Convention of the World Meteorological Organization, Art. 2, found in "Basic
Documents" WMO -no. 15. Bd. 1 (1967) Geneva, Switzerland. This document may
also be found at 26 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 498 (1949).
41. Id. at Art. 3(a),(b),(c) and Annex I. Signatory Countries include:
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
Finland, France, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy,
Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Poland,
Portugal, The Philippines, Siam, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Union of South
Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States,
Uruguay, Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union was present at the Conference of
Directors of the International Meteorological Organization convened in Washington, D.C. on September 22, 1947, but did not sign the Convention. Rumania and Venezuela are the only other such countries. The USSR and 80

other countries were brought in under Arts. 3(b) or 3(c) as well as 10 territories under 3(d).
42.
43.
44.

Id. at Art. 3(d),(e),(f).
Id. at Art. 3(d) and Annex I and II.
Id. at Art. 3(f).

45.

Id. at Art. 3(c),(e).

46.

Id. at Art. 10(a),(3).

47.

See the discussion above on the WMO as an international organization.
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Meteorological Congress, the Executive Committee, the Regional Meteorological Associations, the Technical Commissions, and the Secretariat. The President and three Vice-Presidents of the Organization also
serve as the officers of the Congress and the Executive Committee.4 8
The Secretary-General of the Organization is appointed by the Congress
and is responsible to the President of the Organization for the technical
and administrative work of the Secretariat.49
Developments in technology have made possible a number of new scientific programs that will involve a significant amount of cooperation
between nations and the promulgation of agreements if these programs
are to be successful. For example, the WMO is responsible for the
planning and coordination of the World Weather Watch (WWW),
an international system for the regular observation of the atmosphere
over the globe which concentrates on the rapid and efficient collection,
communication, processing, and analysis of worldwide weather data
for use by all nations. 50 The WMO is also responsible, through a Joint
Organizing Committee (JOC) for cooperation with the International
Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) in the implementation of the Global Atmospheric Research Program (GARP). It is the goal of GARP
to provide scientific knowledge of the atmosphere that can be utilized
by the meteorological services of the world in providing more accurate
weather prediction, developing a capability in long-range weather prediction, and in studying the feasibility of large-scale weather modification. 51
It is apparent that the conclusion of international agreements to implement these programs will require much effort on the part of the
WMO, and that, further, the continued expansion of technology will
create international legal problems that will require competent solution
through the creation of international agreements within the framework of the United Nations and the respective sovereignties of the participating States. Thus, a determination of the functions of the WMO
must go beyond the terms of the Convention and look to the development of the technology which will create conditions that must be dealt
with under a regime of international law which allows for the conclusion of the necessary international agreements.
48.
49.
50.

WMO Cony. supra note 40 at Art. 4.
Id. at Arts. 21(a) and 22(a).
See "World Weather Watch: The

Plan and Implementation Programme,"

World Meteorological Organization, Secretariat, Geneva, Switzerland (1967).
51. See "An Introduction to GARP," (GARP Publication Series No. 1 October,
1969). International Council of Scientific Unions and the World Meteorological Organization.
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The Determination of the Competence within the WMO to Conclude
InternationalAgreements
While it is usually necessary to look to actual practice to determine
the organ competent within an international organization to conclude
international agreements, it is possible to determine some basic facts
from the constituent document. Article 7(a) of the WMO Convention expressly provides:
The Congress is the general assembly of delegates representing
52
Members and as such is the supreme body of the Organization.
If one accepts Dr. Parry's view that, in the absence of a provision to
the contrary in the constitution, the capacity of an international organization to make treaties lies with the plenary organ, 3 then the treatymaking capacity of the WMO would lie with the Congress. In practice,
it turns out that this power is often delegated to the Secretary-General
of the organization. 54
In the WMO Convention, Article 22(a) states that the SecretaryGeneral is responsible to the President of the Organization for the technical and administrative work of the Secretariat. However, in practice
it is the Secretary-General who signs the agreements for the WMO.
There is one example where the President undertook the task of negotiation for the WMO, though the protocol of entry into force of the
agreement was signed by the Secretary-General. 55 Thus even if there
is apparent authority, 6 the question is, who is to exercise it? It has been
suggested that the responsibility for allowing the Secretary-General to
conclude a treaty unacceptable to the organization should lie with the
organization:
52. WMO Conv. supra note 40 at Art. 7(a).
53. Parry, supra note 11 at 114. It was Parry's view that "the principal repository
of power within an international organization is invariably an organ made up of representatives of states rather than an autonomous body or an individual officer." See also,
2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 222, 223, 232 U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/23 (1950).
54. This delegation holds true, particularly for matters that are essentially administrative in nature. For example, with respect to the accession of the UN to the
International High Frequency Broadcasting Agreement, advice was requested by the
concerned department of the UN Secretariat as to the capacity of the SecretaryGeneral to accede to the agreement on behalf of the UN. The answer was positive and
concluded that such capacity existed in view of the exclusively administrative character
of the agreement and the terms of the agreement between the ITU and the UN.
Nevertheless, a report of the action of the Secretary-General was made to the General Assembly. Text of Agreement published by the ITU (Geneva, 1949) Agreement
also noted in Brierly's report on the Law of Treaties (1950). 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n
222, 232, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/23 (1950).
55. The Agreement between the WMO and the UN, Dec. 20, 1951, 123 U.N.T.S.
245.

The protocol noted that the "Congress ...

at its first session . . . appointed its

President and two Vice-Presidents as negotiating officers. . ." Id. at 264.
56. The existence of "apparent authority" regarding international organizations is
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If the chief executive officer acts within a reasonable interpretation of his authorization, fairness would require the organization
concerned to be bound by such action of its executive officer. If
it insists that such agreement is ultra vires and thus invalid, the organization should 57
be held responsible for damages, if any, caused
to the other party.
The Determinationof Full Powers
Regarding the procedures for the conclusion of international agreements, the WMO (as with the other specialized agencies of the United
Nations) decides the matter of accreditation. The General Regulations
of the WMO provide in Regulation 50 that
On receipt of an invitation for the Organization to be represented at
a session of another international organization or one of its constituent bodies, or at joint session of a similar nature, the SecretaryGeneral shall consult the President of the Organization and the
Presidents of the Regional Associations and Technical Commissions most directly concerned, if any, as to whether the invitation
shall be accepted, and, if so, who shall represent the Organization. 8
If the invitation is accepted ".

.

. the representative or representa-

tives of the Organization shall normally be the President or Vice-President of the Association or the Commission most directly concerned or
an official of the Secretariat designated by the Secretary-General."5 "
Further, a competent person living near the place of the meeting may
be designated with the approval of the Permanent Representative of the
country in which the person lives. The issuance of credentials is covered by Regulation 179 which includes among the duties of the Secretary-General the task of issuing the credentials of representatives of the
Organization to attend meetings of other international organizations. 60
The conclusion of any formal agreement, however, is governed by
the provisions of Article 26 which states in paragraph (a) that
The Organization shall establish effective relations and cooperate
closely with such other intergovernmental organizations as may be
desirable. Any formal agreement entered into with such ordisputed by Jessup who states that "It could not properly be asserted . . . that the
Director-General or Secretary-General had 'apparent authority' to conclude the agreement and that the organization was accordingly bound by his act, though the constitution might require ratification or approval by one of the other organs." P. Jessup, A
Modern Law of Nations 130 (1948).

57. Chiu, supra note 10 at 92.
58. WMO General Regulations, Reg. 50, para. 1. Found in "Basic Documents,"
WMO-No. 15, BD. 1 (1967), Geneva, Switzerland.
59. Id. at Reg. 51. Further it is stated that representation at sessions is to be
kept to the minimum consistent with the aims of the Organization.
60. Id. at Reg. 179, para. 4.
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ganization shall be made by the Executive Committee, subject to
approval by two-thirds of the Members which are States, either in
Congress or by correspondence.61
V.

THE AGREEMENTS OF THE

WMO: A FUNCTIONAL

ANALYSIS

The WMO has concluded agreements with the United Nations, ICSU,
IAEA, and the Swiss Federal Council, and it has concluded "working
arrangements" with WHO, FAO, ICAO, UNESCO, ITU, IMCO, the
Danube Commission, ICSU and IUGG. In addition, it has granted
consultative status to fifteen nongovernmental international organizations. While the agreements with the United Nations, IAEA and the
Swiss Federal Council take the standard form for international agreements with a preamble followed by specific articles, the working arrangements take various forms but usually involve an exchange of letters which, in essence, contain a statement of principles for relations
between the organizations. The principles stated in these arrangements
usually involve a pledge of cooperation and mutual consultation in regard to matters of common interest, exchange of pertinent information
and documents, reciprocal attendance at meetings with respect to items
to be discussed presenting an agreed common interest, and the inclusion
of items on the respective agendas. The phraseology utilized-such as
"agreed common interest" and "as may be necessary" suggests that
there would be a certain degree of difficulty involved in any attempt at
interpretation with the purpose of enforcing any legal rights or duties
on either party. The letter of reply from the participating organization is in similar terms and is considered to complete the "basis for
the relations" between the organizations together with the original letter.
The Relationship Agreement with the United Nations
The Relationship Agreement with the United Nations began on
March 10, 1948, with a UN directive concerning negotiations between
the Committee on Negotiations with Intergovernmental Agencies of the
Economic and Social Council and the WMO. Likewise, during its
first session held in Paris in March and April, 1951, the Congress
of the WMO appointed its President and two Vice-Presidents to undertake negotiations with the United Nations Committee. The negotiations
took place on April 5, 1951, in Paris and resulted in a draft agreement.
On April 9, 1951, the Economic and Social Council recommended the
61.

WMO Conv. supra note 40 at Art. 26(a) (Emphasis added).
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Agreement between the United Nations and the World Meteorological
Organization to the General Assembly for its approval. The WMO
approved the agreement during its first session on the next day. The
approval of the General Assembly was given on December 20, 1951,
and the agreement came into force on that day. 62
Coordination and cooperation with the United Nations is assured to
the WMO through the use of this relationship agreement, the authorization for which is provided for in Article 57, paragraph 1 of the United
Nations Charter in accordance with Article 63.63 The Economic and
Social Council is authorized to enter into agreements with any of the
specialized agencies providing that any such agreement is subject to
approval by the General Assembly. For the WMO, Article 26 of its
Convention provides
The Organization shall be brought in relationship to the United Nations pursuant to Article 57 of the Charter of the United Nations.
require approval
Any agreement concerning such relationship shall
64
by two-thirds of the Members which are States.
An interesting provision in this United Nations relationship agreement
states that "The Organization (WMO) agrees to cooperate in whatever further measures may be necessary to make coordination of the
activities of specialized agencies and those of the United Nations fully
The implication is that there could be further internaeffective." 6
tional agreements concluded between the organizations if they were required to further the above objectives.
The content of the agreement with the United Nations is of the usual
form with provision made for reciprocal representation, reciprocal proposals of agenda items and recommendations by the UN, and the exchange of information and documents. 66 The provision for assistance
to the United Nations varies somewhat from the standard form and is
as follows:
62. Agreement Between the United Nations and the World Meteorological Organization, Dec. 20, 1951, 123 U.N.T.S. 245, 119 WMO Basic Doc. - No. 15. BD. 1
(Edition, 1967).
63. Article 57 of the United Nations Charter provides for specialized agencies that
were established by intergovernmental agreement and that had the requisite responsibiltities outlined in their Convention in various areas to be brought into relationship
with the United Nations. Article 63 provides that the Economic and Social Council
may enter into agreements with any of the agencies qualified under Article 57, defining

the terms on which the agency concerned shall be brought into relationship with the
United Nations, and requires the approval of the General Assembly for any such

agreements.
64.
65.

66.

WMO Cony. supra note 40 at Art. 25.
WMO Agreement, supra note 62, at Art. IV para. 3.

Id. at Arts. H through V.
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The Organization agrees to cooperate with and to render all possible assistance to the United Nations, its principal and subsidiary
organs, in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the
World Meteorological Convention, taking fully into account the
particular position of the individual Members of the Organization
67
which are not members of the United Nations.
The authorization is also found here to enable the WMO . . . "to request advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice on legal
questions arising within the scope of its competence other than questions concerning the mutual relationships of the Organization with the
United Nations or with other specialized agencies."6 8
In terms of the initiative for the formation of the agreement, it is clear
that once Article 25 was included in the WMO Constitution that the relationship would be established automatically and the proper form for
the agreement negotiated. The fact that this agreement was the direct
consequence of a constitutional provision which stated that there "shall"
be a relationship left little room for creating a special or unusual type of
agreement. The actual drafting of provisions and negotiating took
place between the Secretariats of the two bodies involved, and it was at
this level that the actual form was decided upon. Since the constituent
instrument of the WMO was drafted after the establishment of the
United Nations, the matter of the relationship with the United Nations
was contemplated from the outset and did not raise any basic constitutional problems within the WMO.
There was no real question of choice or discretion in the matter, and
it was mutually understood that an international agreement was being
created that would have a binding effect on both parties. The fact that
this type of arrangement (an agreement between the United Nations and
its specialized agencies) was concluded with all of these bodies indicated further the appropriate nature of this undertaking.
The Basis for FurtherAgreements
The WMO has the capability of concluding additional agreements
with specialized agencies of the United Nations and other international
67. Id. at Art. VI.
68. Id. at Art. VII para. 2. Subsequent provisions provide for Headquarters and
regional offices (Art. VIII), Personnel arrangements (Art. IX), Statistical services
(Art. X), Administrative and technical services (Art. XI), Budgetary and financial arrangements (Art. XIII), Financing of special services (Art. X3II), Interagency agreements (Art. XIV), Liaison (Art. XV), Implementation (Art. XVI), Revision (Art.
XVII) and Entry into Force (Art. XVIII).
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organizations. An indication of the intention of the WMO to conclude
further agreements is found in Article 14 of the WMO Agreement with
the United Nations:
(1) The Organization agrees to inform the Council of the nature
and scope of any formal agreement contemplated between the
Organization and any other specialized agency or other intergovernmental organization or international nongovernmental
organization, and further to inform the Council of the details
of any such agreement when concluded.
(2) The United Nations agrees to inform the Organization of the
nature and scope of any formal agreement contemplated by
any other specialized agencies on matters which might be of
concern to the Organization and further will inform the Organization of the details of any such agreement, when concluded.6 9
It is interesting to note that agreements are contemplated both with intergovernmental organizations and with nongovernmental international
organizations. It is suggested that the formulation of these agreements
depends to a great extent on the character and status of the organization
involved and the pragmatic nature of the process by which the agreement is reached. The form of the agreement is not necessarily controlling, but rather the critical factor is the practice that has grown up
regarding the conditions for coordination between the bodies involved
and the mutual expectation and intentions of the parties.
The authority for the WMO to conclude agreements with organizations other than the United Nations is found in Article 26(a) and (b)
of the WMO Convention:
(a) The Organization shall establish effective relations and cooperate closely with such other intergovernmental organizations
as may be desirable. Any formal agreement entered into with
such organization shall be made by the Executive Committee,
subject to approval by two-thirds of the Members which are
States, either in Congress or by correspondence'.
(b) The Organization may on matters within its purposes make
suitable arrangements for consultation and cooperation with
nongovernmental international organizations and, with the
consent of the government concerned, with national organizations, governmental, or nongovernmental. 7 0
This provision contemplates formal agreements with regard to intergovernmental organizations and arrangements for consultation and co69.
70.

Id. at Art. XIV.
WMO Convention, supra note 40, Art. 26(a),(b).
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operation with nongovernmental organizations or national organizations. It, in effect, may narrow the scope of interpretation of the clause
found in Article 14 of the WMO agreement with the United Nations
since it does not refer to formal agreements being made with nongovernmental organizations. It is significant to note that various types of
arrangements are provided for, but that it is only as to formal agreements
with intergovernmental organizations that approval by a two-thirds vote
of members who are States is required. Regarding the other types of
agreements, the only provision is that "suitable arrangements" must be
made.
The Agreement with the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency 7
This agreement is similar to those that the IAEA has concluded with
several other specialized agencies. It contains clauses pertaining to
cooperation and consultation, reciprocal representation, the exchange of
information and documents, reciprocal proposal of agenda items, cooperation between Secretariats, administrative and technical cooperation, statistical services, personnel arrangements, the financing of special services, implementation of the agreement, notification to the UN
and filing and recording, revision and termination, and entry into force.
The promulgation of this agreement was, in part, a response to a
particular set of circumstances. Since the IAEA is not technically a
specialized agency of the United Nations,7 2 there were competency arguments regarding the role of the IAEA which resulted in a desire for
the creation of formal agreements to dramatize the attempts at obtaining harmony among the various international organizations. The
United Nations, for its part, wished to stress the aspect of cooperation
and it was thought that this could be best done with a formal document.
In essence this was a special case necessitated by political circumstances, and thus the choice of a formal document did not rest with the
WMO and was not the result of a reasoned analysis by the WMO as
to the form that the agreement should take.
73
The Agreement with the Swiss Federal Council

This agreement is concerned with the legal status of the WMO in
71. Agreement Between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the World
Meteorological Organization. 341 U.N.T.S. 341; WMO Doc., No. 15. BD. 1. at 131.
72. It was first related to the General Assembly and later it was agreed that it
should report to ECOSOC. See the Statute of the IAEA at 8 U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S.
No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 4. Article XVI of the IAEA provides that it can enter into
agreements with the United Nations and other organizations.
73. "Agreement Between the Swiss Federal Council and the World Meteorological
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Switzerland whereby the Organization is granted ". . . the independence and liberty of action which is its right as an international institution,' 74 and whereby the Swiss Federal Council recognizes "the international character and judicial capacity in Switzerland . . ."7 of the
Organization. The general content of the agreement covers the immunities granted to the Organization which are the same as those
granted to the European Office of the United Nations.7 6 Matters dealt
with include the extra-territoriality and inviolability of the grounds and
premises, the exemption from censorship, the freedom of entrance and
sojournment, the immunities of the Secretary-General, staff members
and representatives of Members, and the non-responsibility and security
of Switzerland. These and the other provisions are included, "solely
in order to ensure the free functioning under all circumstances of the
World Meteorological Organization and the complete independence of
its staff members. ' 77 In addition to the agreement there is also a Plan
of Execution7 8 containing twelve articles regarding specific matters such
as identity cards and facilities accorded to non-Swiss staff members, and
a Protocol 79 which provides for the re-opening of negotiations regarding the issuance of special postage stamps by the WMO.
Of interest are the provisions relating to dispute settlement found in
the agreement. Article 22 provides that the WMO is responsible both
for making the appropriate provisions for the satisfactory settlement of
contractual differences to which the Organization is a party and other
differences bearing on a point of civil law, and for making provisions
for settlement when a staff member of the WMO enjoying immunity is
implicated. 0 Even more important are the provisions in Article 26
which establish arbitration as the method of dispute settlement:
1. Any divergence of views concerning the application or interOrganization," (Mar. 10, 1955) 211 U.N.T.S. 277; WMO-No. 15 B.D. 1, at 155
(Ed. 1967).
74. Id. at Art. 1.
75. Id. at Art. 2.
76. Id. at Art. 3.
77. Id. at Art. 20. The limiting provision in the second paragraph of this Article
calls upon the Secretary-General of the WMO to withdraw the immunity of a staff
member when he considers that it hinders the "normal course of justice and it is
possible to do so without menacing the interests of the World Meteorological Organization." Ibid.
78. "Plan of Execution of the Agreement Concluded Between the Swiss Federal
Council and the World Meteorological Organization," Mar. 10, 1955, 211 U.N.T.S.
293 WMO-No. 15. BD. 1 at 162 (Ed. 1967).
79. "Protocol concerning the Agreement Between the Swiss Federal Council and
the World Meteorological Organization," Mar. 10, 1955, 211 U.N.T.S. 301 WMO-No.
15, BD. 1 at 166 (Ed. 1967).
80. Swiss Fed. Council Agreement supra note 73 at Art. 22.
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pretation of the present agreement, or of its plan of execution,
which it shall not have been possible to settle by direct
discussion between the parties, can be submitted by one or the
other of the parties to the judgment of a tribunal composed of
three members which will be formed upon the entry into force
of the present agreement.
2. The Swiss Federal Council and the World Meteorological Organization will each choose one member of the tribunal.
3. The judges thus designated will choose their president.
4. In the event of disagreement between the judges on the question of the president, the latter will be designated by the President of the International Court of Justice, upon the request of
the members of the tribunal.
5. Matters will be referred to the tribunal by one or the other
party, in the form of a claim.
6. The tribunal will decide upon its own form of procedure. 8'
While the above provision deals with the application or interpretation of
the agreement, Article 28 considers the revision of the agreement and
provides that the two parties will discuss the necessary changes and if
these negotiations do not terminate in an understanding within one
year, "the agreement can be denounced by one or the other party after
a notice of two years." 82 Thus, it would appear that this agreement,
which is completed by its Plan of Execution, evidences an intent to
conclude an international agreement that will be binding on both parties and will create duties and obligations which are subject to dispute
settlement procedures in the event of controversy.
FurtherAgreements with InternationalOrganizations
There are a number of pragmatic considerations which have affected the agreements undertaken between the WMO and the specialized
agencies of the United Nations. First, at the outset, the WMO had an
extremely small budget and there was doubt as to its effectiveness, and
hence doubt on the part of other international organizations as to the
desirability of entering into cooperation agreements with it. Other international organizations were doubtful because it seemed as if the cooperative efforts might all be in one direction. This sense of uncertainty controlled to some extent the type of agreements formulated at
the early stages of WMO development.
81. Id. at Art. 26.
82. Id. at Art. 28. Article 12 of the Plan of Execution provides for a similar
process regarding the modification of the plan, 211 U.N.T.S. at 299.
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Second, the conclusion of any formal agreement with other international agencies would require, under the provisions of Article 26(a)
of the WMO Convention, a two-thirds vote of the Members who are
States. Since it was very unlikely that a two-thirds vote could be obtained at a Congress, which was held only once in four years, it would
necessitate a vote by correspondence which was time consuming and
might prove inconclusive. Thus, it was decided to utilize an exchange
of letters which would result in an informal arrangement that could be
quickly and satisfactorily developed. The primary objective was to obtain the necessary working arrangements, and there was little concern
83
with the legalities of the situation.
The Working Arrangements with WHO and UNESCO
An example of the use of the exchange of letters is found in the
working arrangement concluded with the World Health Organization. 4
The letters were exchanged between the executive heads of the two
organizations and the exchange was made within a time period of only
two months. Prior to the exchange of letters there were informal meetings between representatives of the organizations which resulted in basic
agreement as to the content and form of the letters, following which the
basis for the understanding was formulated and stated in identical terms
in the letters.
In the working arrangement with the WHO, provision is made for
cooperation, consultation, information and document exchange, reciprocal representation on items having an agreed common interest, and
reciprocal inclusion of agenda items "subject to such preliminary consultation as may be necessary." These items are designated as principles
and not as binding provisions of a treaty, and they are said only to establish the basis for relations between the organizations. In content, there
is very little difference between the agreement with IAEA and the working arrangement with the WHO. The basic difference is that two-thirds
of the membership of the WMO and the General Conference of IAEA
approved the former agreement, while the latter working arrangement
was approved by a Resolution of the Executive Committee of the WMO
and noted by a Resolution of the Second World Meteorological Congress,
October, 1969, Geneva,
83. Interview the World Meteorological Organization.
Switzerland.
84. Letter from the Acting Director of WHO to the Secretary-General of the
WMO, Feb. 26, 1952. Reply letter from the Secretary-General of the WMO, April 25,
1952. WMO Agreements and Working Arrangements with Other International Organizations, No. 60 BD. 4, at 31.
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and approved by the WHO in a Resolution of the Fifth World Health Assembly.
The exchange of letters with UNESCO 5 was essentially similar to
that concluded with the WHO with the exception that a clause was
added which stated:
The cooperation referred to in the above paragraphs will apply
to matters mutually recognized as presenting a joint interest and
included or to be included in the regular programmes, as well as in
the technical assistance programs, of both Organizations. In addition, the cooperation will provide for specific agreements on individual projects in meteorology, whenever such agreements are mutually desirable and within the scope of the actions authorized by
86
the governing bodies of the Organizations.

The above clause would appear to be an attempt to limit the scope of cooperation, and to require specific arrangements for particular projects
which are mutually desirable and are authorized in the appropriate manner. This points out the general character of the provisions contained in
an exchange of letters and indicates the provisional nature of such an
exchange.
Principlesof Cooperation with the FAO
The description of the arrangement with the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations as "principles of cooperation" indicates that there is not always even the formality of an exchange of
identical statements of principles. In the letter from the FAO to
the WMO8

7

it was stated that:

Experience also shows that agreements of a general character are
not really necessary to facilitate practical working arrangements
since joint projects have been carried out in a very satisfactory way
with organizations with which we had no basic agreement. To my
mind, the important thing, given the willingness to cooperate, is to
work out specific agreements in relation to concrete projects whenever the practical details of cooperation have to be specific. 88
This excerpt indicates that the general agreement, which may be charac85. Letter from the Director-General of UNESCO to the Secretary-General of
WMO, May 5, 1954. Reply letter from the Deputy Secretary-General of the WMO,
Sept. 17, 1954. WMO-No. 60.BD.4. at 45.

86.

Letter from the Director-General of UNESCO to the Secretary-General of

WMO, May 5, 1954.
87. Letter from Herbert Broadley, Acting Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations to Dr. G. Svoboda, Secretary-General of
the World Meteorological Organization. Dated Rome, Aug. 26, 1952. WMO-No. 60.
BD.4. at 34.
88.

Id. at 35.
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terized as an agreement to agree, does not have any legal status and
may not even have any value as an instrument for defining principles for
cooperation in the absence of a set of specific circumstances. The letter
goes on to reject the mutual submission of items for agenda discussion
and the creation of a joint panel of representatives. All that was immediately accomplished was that the WMO was put on the FAO mailing list and it was stated that invitations would be issued for sending
observers to appropriate meetings. The reply from the WMO stated,
nevertheless, that the letter from the FAO was considered as "a basis
of agreement and a first step towards close collaboration between the
two Organizations." 9
While it would appear that not much would be accomplished regarding cooperative ventures from this exchange of letters, in fact, this
exchange represents an early hesitance to enter into agreements with
the WMO and has not hindered the subsequent arrangements made
with the FAO on specific matters. In practice, the limiting terms of the
FAO letter have never been referred to in an attempt to limit the scope
of cooperation.9 0
The Working Arrangement with ICAO
The arrangements with the International Civil Aviation Organization
do not fall within the category of formal inter-agency agreements as referred to in Article XIV of the Agreement between the WMO and the
United Nations, but rather they are designed to:
. . .record the understanding reached between the two Organizations to delineate their respective spheres of activity in the field of
aeronautical meteorology, to provide machinery for their collaboration when necessary and to give guidance for the conduct of meetings of representative bodies and the Secretariats of the two Organizations and thus to assist in the realization of the aims outlined
in the preamble to this document. 91
The document itself consists of a Preamble and numbered paragraphs
dealing with specific topics. It is much more detailed than the majority of working arrangements and contains a concluding section on
the conditions of application which appears to be an attempt to give
some independent status to the document itself:
89. Letter from the WMO to the FAO, Geneva, Oct. 14, 1952, supra note 87 at 36.
90. Interview World Meteorological Organization, Oct. 1969, Geneva, Switzerland.
91. Introduction, Working Arrangements with the International Civil Aviation Organization, 37, found in "Agreements and Working Arrangements," WMO-No. 60. BD.
4 (2nd ed. 1961).
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The working arrangements specified above:
(a) Shall be given effect within each Organization by means of
such directives as may be considered by the Organization
concerned as necessary to implement them.
(b) Shall be regarded as being of an interim character, the relation between the Organizations, the arrangements for cooperation between them and the definition of their respective activities in the area of joint interest having continued consideration and being further reviewed if necessary.
(c) Shall be subject to modification at any time by joint agreement.
(d) Shall be subject to the understanding that any provision
therein shall be terminable on ninety days notice in writing by
92
either Organization to the other.
In accordance with the usual procedures, the Executive Committee of
the WMO approved the arrangements and they were noted by the World
Meteorological Congress.93 They were also approved by the Council of
ICAO. However, following approval of the arrangements there appeared to be confusion over whether they were to be considered as a
formal document in which there could be revocation of a provision after
ninety days notice (Subsection (d) above) and for which there must be
joint agreement for review (Subsection (c) above), or whether it was
merely an informal statement of areas of agreement of an interim nature (Subsection (b) above) which would become operative only after
internal directives had been issued to implement its provisions (Subsection (a) above). If consideration is given to the introduction, partially
quoted above, 94 it is probable that the document was not intended to
create any distinct legal obligations, but was drafted in a detailed form in
response to the technical needs for a comprehensive statement of joint
responsibilities rather than in an attempt to create a document with
independent binding force.
The Working Arrangements with the ITU and IMCO
The relationship established with the International Telecommunication Union9 5 demonstrated a variation in form to the extent that it
92. Id. at 44.
93. Approval was given at the fourth session of the Executive Committee of the
WMO meeting in Geneva Oct. 23, 1953 by Resolution 6 (Cg-ll) of the Second World
Meteorological Congress in Geneva, April-May, 1955.
94. See text at note 91.
95. "Working Arrangements with the International Telecommunication Union,"
WMO-No. 60. BD. 4 at 48 (2nd ed., 1961, amended).
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was based specifically on a resolution of the Administrative Council of
the ITU which formed the basis of the letter sent to the WMO from
the Secretary-General of the ITU.9 6 The ITU Resolution recommended that the procedures for co-operation ".

.

. be informally agreed

to as a modus vivendi governing consultations. . .
and referred to the
following procedures:
Each of the above organizations shall:
(a) Invite the others to those of its conferences or meetings where
questions of common interest will be studied;
(b) Include in the agenda of its conferences or meetings questions submitted by anyone of the other organizations;
(c) Keep the others constantly informed of contemplated tasks
and programmes believed to be of common interest and currently supplied, free of charge, with all relevant documents
of mutual interest subject to such measures as are necessary
to protect confidential material;
(d) Take all possible steps to facilitate mutual collaboration including the formation, whenever desirable, of mixed committees comprising technicians of the organizations particularly
98
competent in the matters under consideration.
This statement of principles for cooperation represented an attempt by
the ITU to standardize the content of their working arrangements
with such organizations as the WMO, ICAO and IMCO. The reply
letter sent by the Secretary-General of the WMO reiterated the ITU
formulation of the general principles and stated that the exchange of
formal letters embodying the principles would serve as the "basis for
continuing relations" 99 between the organizations. The content of the
ITU Resolution has found a broader application beyond its use in ITU
96. Letter from the Secretary-General of the WMO, dated April 25, 1960, Geneva;
WMO-No. 60. BD. 4 at 48.
97. "Relations between the International Telecommunication Union and other
specialized agencies having a substantive interest in telecommunication services," Res.
196 of the Administrative Council of the ITU approved during its fifth session in 1950
and amended during its ninth session in 1954.

98. Id. at subsection 4.
99. Letter from the Secretary-General of the WMO to the Secretary-General of the
ITU, dated Aug. 22, 1960, Geneva. WMO-No. 60. BD. 4 at 51. The form utilized by
the ITU in the letter to the WMO was as follows:
The Secretariat of each of our Organizations shall:
(a) Regularly exchange views and consult as necessary with the other;
(b) Invite the other to those of its conferences or meetings where questions
of common interest will be studied;
(c) Take all possible steps to facilitate mutual collaboration including the
formation, whenever desirable, of mixed committees comprising technicians particularly competent in the matters under consideration;
(d) Include in the agenda of its conferences or meetings questions submitted
by the other Organization.
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working arrangements, since it has been used by the WMO in subsequent negotiations with organizations as a basis for the creation of working arrangements.
The use of the statement of principles from the ITU Resolution was
illustrated in a recent agreement concluded by the WMO: the working
arrangements with the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization.10 0 The letter from the Secretary-General of the WMO
listed the five principles extracted from the ITU Resolution and then
stated that they should be considered as the basis for continuing relaThe reply from IMCO' ° ' simply
tions between the organizations.'
referred to the principles and did not repeat them, the statement being
made that they were entirely acceptable to IMCO and would be considered as the basis for continuing relations between the organizations.
The Working Arrangements with a Regional Intergovernmental Organization: The Danube Commission
The WMO has concluded working arrangements with the Danube
Commission through an exchange of formal letters which consisted of
statements of three principles for cooperation including a pledge of cooperation, an agreement for the mutual exchange of information, and
an arrangement for the reciprocal participation of Members in the sessions and meetings of the other Organization which related to items of
common interest.10 ' This agreement, with a regional organization,
was concluded primarily because of the existence of a mutual interest
in scientific matters which made cooperation beneficial. The initial
contact was made by the Commission, and it was thought that this would
establish a good precedent for future cooperative efforts with regional
groups. It was also significant that the Soviet Union had an interest in
this situation.
100.

"Working Arrangements with the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative

Organization," WMO-No. 60. BD. 4 at 52 (2nd Ed., 1961, amended), Geneva, Switzerland.
101. Letter from the Secretary-General of the WMO to the Secretary-General of
IMCO dated Aug. 22, 1960, Geneva. The arrangements were approved by the Executive Committee of the WMO at its 12th session in June-July, 1960.
102. Reply Letter from the Secretary-General of IMCO to the Secretary-General
of the WMO, dated Aug. 25, 1960, London. The arrangements were approved on behalf of IMCO by its Council at its third session in January 1960 in London.
103. "Agreements and Working Arrangements," WMO No. 60. BD. 4 (2nd Ed.
1961, amended), Geneva, Switzerland, at 54c. Letter from the Secretary-General of the

WMO to the Director of the Secretariat and Services of the Danube Commission,

dated July 25, 1962, Geneva. Reply letter from the Director of the Secretariat and
Services, dated Oct. 17, 1962, Budapest. Hereinafter cited as "Agreements ... "
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The Working Arrangements, Agreement, and Consultative Status Provisions Concluded with Nongovernmental InternationalOrganizations
The WMO has found it necessary to cooperate with scientific bodies
that are not necessarily official governmental organizations nor are they
governmental international organizations in the strict sense of the term,
and in substance the agreements arrived at have proven to be significant
in terms of the work carried out by each organization. The arrangements usually provide for recognition of the competence of each body
and go beyond the pledges of cooperation by providing that joint committees can be established and a permanent liaison officer may be appointed. These agreements are partially necessitated by the fact that
scientific research is organized differently in various States and allowance must be made for this in the types of agreements adopted. One
means of reaching agreement for cooperation with scientists, whether
sponsored privately (such as many are in the United States) or whether
sponsored by governmental ministries, is to conclude a set of working
arrangements with the scientific organizations of which the scientists
are members. A further benefit of this type of arrangement is that possible conflicts with governmental political policies are minimized by
direct cooperative efforts since the scientists act as representatives of
their nongovernmental scientific body rather than as government
spokesmen.
There are two main types of agreements entered into by the WMO
with nongovernmental international organizations. The first type consists of a formal statement of provisions setting out the responsibilities of
each organization, and the second type merely provides for consultative status for the nongovernmental organization in its relations with the
WMO. The determination of which type of agreement will be established rests primarily on the extent to which there is a need for actual
cooperation between the organizations on a practical level, but there
are also special cases as with the GARP Agreement.
The Working Arrangements with ICSU and IUGG
The working arrangements with the International Council of Scientific Unions 0 4 were necessitated partially by the fact that ICSU had the
responsibility for the International Geophysical Year and the WMO had
an interest in the IGY through a major data project for gathering mete104.

Agreements.

.

. supra note 103 at 57.
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orological information. There was a mutual desire for a formal document since it was thought that there would be numerous instances of
cooperation both with the IGY and with future projects. 10 5 In addition to the inclusion of the phraseology regarding the desire for mutual
cooperation, there was also provision for the formal recognition of the
competence of each organization:
The World Meteorological Organization, in implementing this
clause of the working arrangements, shall be guided by its recognition of the International Council of Scientific Unions as an International forum for the advancement of meteorology as a science, and
of allied scientific disciplines ....
106
In return, ICSU recognized the primary responsibility of the WMO for
the international organization of meteorology, for the furthering of its
application to all human activities and for the encouragement of meteorological research and training through intergovernmental cooperation. Further provisions allowed for the designation of a permanent
liaison officer to maintain contact with the other Organization and the
creation, when appropriate, of joint committees to deal with matters of
common interest.
There was no formal exchange of letters, but the working arrangements were approved on behalf of ICSU by a decision of its Executive
Board at its twelfth session in Lisbon in October 1960, and by the Executive Committee of the WMO by Resolution 5(EC-XII) adopted at its
twelfth session in Geneva during June and July, 1960. The earlier
working arrangement between the WMO and the IUGG in 1954 provided the format for the ICSU document and contained virtually identical provisions. 107
The Agreement with ICSU on the Global Atmospheric Research Program
The interdependence of various scientific organizations can be seen
with reference to the Global Atmospheric Research Program (GARP).
105. Interview the World Meteorological Organization, October, 1969, Geneva,
Switzerland.

106. Agreements. .. supra note 103 at 57.
107. Agreements . . . supra note 103 at 59. The arrangements were approved by
Resolution 36 of the Tenth General Assembly of the IUGG Assembly in Rome in
Sept. 1954. They had been approved by Resolution 4 (EC-IV) of the fourth session of

the Executive Committee of the WMO in October, 1953 in Geneva, and were noted by
Resolution 6 (Cg-II) of the Second World Meteorological Congress in Geneva during
April and May, 1955. An additional protocol was approved by both Organizations
which extended the working arrangements mutatis mutandis to the meteorological ac-

tivities involved in hydrology and other geophysical disciplines within the competence
of the WMO.
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It was a joint ICSU/IUGG Committee on Atmospheric Sciences (CAS)
which, together with the ICSU Committee on Space Research
(COSPAR), jointly organized and co-sponsored with the WMO the
first major international planning conference for GARP in July 1967.108
The scientific purpose of GARP is to develop an international cooperative research effort dealing with the development of scientific knowledge
of the general circulation of the atmosphere and a determination of the
bases for long-range weather prediction. There are diverse participants
in the program with individual scientists and technology specialists from
universities, industry, government laboratories, and associated national
meteorological services. The WMO interest in GARP stems from the
fact that it forms an integral part of the WMO World Weather Watch
(WWW) which will be a continuing observational program. Because
of these common interests it was agreed that a formal document should
be formulated that would define the co-sponsorship of GARP.
The agreement between the WMO and ICSU on the Global Atmospheric Research Program 9 was signed on October 10, 1967,
and approved by the WMO Fifth Congress and by the ICSU Assembly.
Reference was made at the beginning of the agreement to two significant facts. The first fact was to the effect that two Resolutions of
the United Nations General Assembly had called upon the WMO and
ICSU to take appropriate action to ensure that satellite meteorology
would be used for the benefit of all nations. Specifically, the General
Assembly, in its first resolution, had requested the WMO and nongovernmental organizations such as ICSU to submit a report "regarding appropriate organizational and financial arrangements . . .""I for
developing a comprehensive program, and in its second resolution had
recommended the further development of an expanded program to
strengthen meteorological services and research.1 11 Further, ICSU was
specifically invited to develop an expanded program of atmospheric science research which would complement the programs fostered by the
WMO. The second significant fact referred to in the agreement was a
108. "The Global Atmospheric Research Programme (GARP)," Report of the Study
Conference held at Stockholm, June 28-July 11, 1967.
109. "Agreement Between the World Meteorological Organization and the International Council of Scientific Unions on the Global Atmospheric Research Programme," Signed at Rome, Italy, Oct. 10, 1967. For the text of the Agreement see
Appendix I.
110. G.A. Res. 1721, 17 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. 17 at 6, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961),
entitled "International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space," at para. 2.
111. G.A. Res. 1802, 17 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. 17 at 5, U.N. Doc. A/517 (1962),
entitled "International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space," at para. 3.
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citation of the existing working arrangements between the organizations
as the basis for the cooperative effort. The direct concern of the
United Nations with the program and the realization that the working
arrangements were not sufficient to form the necessary organizational
structure served to remove this agreement from the general "working
arrangements" category and place it on a higher level in terms of its international significance.
The Agreement not only provided for the joint sponsorship of the
Program but it also provided for the development of a jointly-agreed
program of activities which would include the three major elements of
GARP which were (1) the determination of scientific objectives and
content of programs, (2) the design of observational and logistical systems, and (3) the implementation of the entire program including data
acquisition, processing and analysis. Further, a Joint Organizing Committee and a Joint Planning Staff were created to implement the
program. In an Annex to the Agreement it stated that all major decisions would be taken jointly by the two organizations and that the methods of implementing the decisions would be agreed jointly. When the
actual implementation is to be on a joint basis, the procedures and
methods adopted must conform to the basic constitutions of both organizations, while when one organization accepts sole responsibility, the
terms of its constitution must be followed. As the GARP program and
others like it are developed, it is probable that the areas of cooperation
between the WMO and nongovernmental scientific bodies will increase
and more detailed arrangements will have to be developed, particularly
when large sums of money are to be expended in the programs.
Consultative Status for Nongovernmental International Organizations
The idea of creating a consultative status for nongovernmental organizations was codified by Resolution 2 (EC-IV) of the fourth session of
the WMO Executive Committee in 1953. The purpose of this status
". .. is to provide a common basis of cooperation with nongovemnental international organizations interested in the activities of the World
Meteorological Organization." ' 1 2 Consultative status is granted by a
Resolution by the Executive Committee of the WMO to a number of organizations. 1 3
112.
113.

Agreements . . .supra note 103 at 63.
The following organizations have been granted consultative status by virtue of

Resolutions by the Executive Committee of the WMO: International Society of Soil
Science; International Organization for Standardization; International Radio Maritime
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Consultative status accords the nongovernmental international organization the following privileges on a reciprocal basis:
(i) Entitlement to be represented by an observer without voting
rights at sessions of the World Meteorological Organization
Congress;
(ii) The possibility of being invited by the Secretary-General,
after consultation with the president of the constituent body
concerned, to sessions of the regional associations or of the
technical commissions in which it is interested;
(iii) Entitlement to present, at these meetings, working documents
on items on the agenda of the meeting which are of particular
interest to it;
(iv) Entitlement to propose items for the agenda of the meetings to
which it has been invited."14
The tentative wording of these provisions underlines the limited applicability of the consultative status. It is used primarily as a formality
with organizations where there is minimal contact with the WMO. It
is probable that if any items of major cooperation were undertaken with
these organizations that a more formal document such as those concluded with the IUGG and ICSU would be formulated.
VI.

ASSESSMENT

Inasmuch as there are States Members of the WMO, that it is not
subject to any other organized community, and that it has the capability
of assuming independent obligations, it may be concluded that the
WMO is an international organization for purposes of a consideration
of the international legal validity of its various external agreements. As
a means of ascertaining this validity, the determinative criteria set forth
earlier in this work" 5 stressed the existence of express provisions in the
constituent document, the necessary implications arising from the compliance required to enable the organization to function effectively, and
the expectations and intentions of the representatives of the organizations
when concluding an agreement. The WMO Convention does not expressly preclude the Organization from concluding international agreeCommittee; International Federation for Agricultural Producers; International Scientific
Radio Union; International Federation of Airline Pilots' Associations; World Federation of United Nations Associations; International Federation for Documentation; Pacific Science Association; World Power Conference; International Astronomical
Union; International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage; International Society of
Biometeorology; International Airline Navigators Council; and the International Astronautical Federation.
114. Agreements. . . supra note 103 at 64.
115. See text following note 21.
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ments, and in fact Articles 25 and 26 provide for such arrangements.
As the Convention is basically formulated in terms of purposes and functions rather than in terms of legal authority or power and there is no exhaustive enumeration of the acts that the Organization can perform, it
can be concluded that under the proper circumstances the WMO can
conclude international agreements.
In addition to the Convention reference, it is also desirable to consider
the implications arising from the basic purposes and functions of the
Organization which are enumerated in the Convention and involve the
furtherance of international cooperation in establishing a global meteorological network, the promotion of an effective data exchange system,
the promotion of the standardization of observations, the application of
meteorology to major problem areas, and the encouragement of research
and training. A reasonable interpretation of these purposes and functions should also involve a further consideration of the advances of technology in the areas of satellite meteorology and the use of computers,
the implication being that there may be some areas where international
agreement is desirable but which may not ordinarily be considered in
the terms of reference of the activities of the WMO. To the extent that
various agreements come within these purposes and functions of the
Organization, they can be considered for classification as international
agreements.
Finally, it is necessary to consider the subjective criterion of the expectations and intentions of the parties to an agreement. To some extent this can be determined by an examination of the form and content
of the documents, by interviews with the personnel involved to discover
the practice of the Organization, and by an evaluation of whatever supporting documentation is available. The implications should be accepted that will enable the WMO to most effectively deal with the practical and technical problems that will arise within the scope of its activities.
The framework for the application of the above criteria is the regime
of international law that one wishes to adopt. To the extent that international law is considered a dynamic process, one goal of which is obtaining international agreement in areas where a nonstructured situation
is undesirable, then sustaining the genuine interests of the parties to
agreements becomes a valuable undertaking. However, it is not desirable to create the appearance of an international agreement where, in
fact, the parties merely intended to indicate their willingness to cooper-
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ate and to enter into future specific agreements when necessary. The
type of agreement concluded-international agreement, working arrangement or consultative status-will determine the degree of predictability desired in a specific context, and the extent to which binding
obligations are to be imposed. While it is suggested that the form of
the agreement should not be the determinative criterion, nevertheless
the utilization of a certain format and the inclusion of certain clauses
do have significance. Thus, it is possible for some agreements of international organizations to have the form of international agreements
while still not creating any legal obligations. Although one can argue
that if an agreement does not provide for the judicial settlement of disputes that it does not create a relationship of obligation based on compulsory settlement, the better view would appear to be that it is possible
for a legal right to exist in international law without the existence of a
specific enforceable sanction in certain circumstances.
In light of the above criteria it is suggested that the parallel resolutions of the IMO and its successor, the WMO, which are provided for in
Art. 26(c) of the WMO Convention (pertaining to taking over the functions of another international agency by means of an international agreement), constitute an international agreement. Similarly the agreements
with the United Nations and the Swiss Federal Council should be
treated in a like manner. The agreement with the United Nations which
is referred to in Article 25 of the WMO Convention has received the
approval of two thirds of the Members which are States and is considered by the participants to be an international agreement. The agreement with the Swiss Federal Council contains provisions for dispute
settlement and establishes a series of legal rights and duties which would
significantly alter the functions of the WMO if it were not observed,
and thus should also be considered as an international agreement.
Two ambiguous situations exist concerning the WMO agreements
with IAEA and ICSU for the creation of the Global Atmospheric Research Program. While Art. 26(a) of the WMO Convention refers to
formal agreements concluded with other intergovernmental organizations requiring a two-thirds vote of Members which are States, and the
IAEA agreement was so approved, the circumstances surrounding the
conclusion of the agreement (mentioned earlier) explain the use of a
formal document and lessen the implication that an international agreement was contemplated. It would appear that the substance of the
agreement most closely approximates that of the working arrangements
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with the specialized agencies of the UN, and therefore it should be considered in this way. In essence, this agreement outlines principles rather
than creating rights and obligations.
The GARP agreement with ICSU creates further ambiguity in that
Art. 26(b) of the WMO Convention only refers generally to the "suitable arrangements" to be made with nongovernmental international organizations within the purposes of the Organization. The WMO Congress endorsed the concept of GARP, approved the draft agreement between WMO and ICSU, and requested the WMO Executive Committee
to negotiate the agreement. The Executive Committee authorized the
President to enter into negotiations, and the agreement was signed by
the presidents of WMO and ICSU on October 10, 1967. It was subsequently endorsed by the Executive Committee. It provides for the establishment of a specific scientific program involving the expenditure of
money by both participants. If one considers the "suitable arrangements" reference in light of Art. 14 of the WMO/UN Agreement which
allows for formal agreements with international nongovernmental organizations, and if consideration is given to the existence of the UN General Assembly Resolutions directing this endeavor, then it would be possible to consider this as an international agreement.
In the case of the working arrangements concluded with the various
international governmental organizations, the one regional governmental organization, and the one nongovernmental international organization, it is suggested that the expectations and intentions of the parties, as
seen within the context of Art. 26 of the WMO Convention, were to
create a relationship which would facilitate cooperation but which would
not possess the ramifications of an international agreement. The mention of the need for specific agreements for particular projects found in
the UNESCO and FAO arrangements further supports this position.
The characterization of the consultative status granted by the WMO to
certain organizations should be treated in a similar fashion.
One means by which future ambiguity over the status of the working
arrangements could be avoided would be to adopt a standard form for
these arrangements such as was used by the WMO in the exchange with
the ITU and subsequently in the exchange with IMCO. The inclusion
of provisions in addition to those found in the standard form could be
considered to have special significance in terms of the legal interpretation of the arrangements. It would appear, however, that the preferable
circumstance would be for the working arrangements to continue to denote an informal relationship, with the necessity existing for a formal
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agreement (such as in the case of the WMO/ICSU Agreement on
GARP) to be concluded if the designation of "international agreement"
were desired.
What this analysis indicates is that the WMO is capable of entering
into international agreements, that it has done so in several situations,
and that it has also retained for itself the potential of concluding further
international agreements from the basis of the existing working arrangements and consultative status arrangements with various organizations.
It is suggested that it is not the distinction between governmental international organization and nongovernmental international organization that
is significant, but rather that the distinguishing characteristic is the content of the proposed agreement and whether it fits within the frame of
reference of the activities of the organization. While this may not be the
most precise distinction to make in terms of creating a series of codified
rules for the conclusion of international agreements by international
organizations, it is submitted that it will result in international scientific
progress, will make the actions and behavior of the participants to the
agreements more predictable, and will result in a growth of the use of
international law in a positive way rather than as a set of artificial limitations on international activity. It is apparent that the international
agreements of organizations such as the WMO are qualitatively different from the international agreements of States, and this distinction
should be used to faclitate the work of the international organizations to
the greatest extent possible. Thus, the growth of international law concerning the ablity of international organizations to conclude international agreements will benefit from efforts to determine the legal character of the agreements of organizations such as the WMO, and political
decision-makers will be able to more clearly consider the legal implication of future agreements to which the WMO is a party.
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APPENDIX I
Agreement
Between the World Meteorological Organization and the
International Council of Scientific Unions on the
Global Atmospheric Research Programme

The WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION and the
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF SCIENTIFIC UNIONS,
Recognizing that modem scientific and technological developments,
notably in the field of satellite meteorology and in the use of high-speed
electronic computers for meteorological purposes, present an opportunity for unprecedented progress in man's understanding of the atmospheric processes and for applying such knowledge for practical purposes; and
Noting that the nations of the world, through the medium of the
General Assembly of the United Nations (Resolutions 1721 (XVI) and
1802 (XVII) and in other ways, have called upon WMO and ICSU to
take appropriate action to ensure that this opportunity is taken for the
benefit of all countries;
Being mindful of the Working Arrangements agreed upon by the
two organizations which specify that "the two organizations, with a view
to facilitating the attainment, in the most effective and economical manner, of the objectives set forth in their respective constitutions, will act in
close cooperation,.
AGREE:
1) To sponsor jointly a Global Atmospheric Programme (GARP) as
outlined in the First and Second Reports of the ICSU/IUGG Committee
on Atmospheric Sciences (CAS) and the Reports of the Third and
Fourth Sessions of the WMO Advisory Committee; and to this end
(2) To develop and keep under review a jointly agreed programme of
activities for the planning and implementation of GARP, including
GARP Sub-programmes, taking into account the three major elements of
GARP, namely, determination of scientific objectives and content of
programmes, design of observational and logistical systems, and the
implementation of the whole programme including data acquisition,
processing and analysis;
(3) To establish a joint GARP Organizing Committee for the following
purposes:
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(a) To consider, to endorse and to recommend jointly to ICSU
and WMO scientific goals and plans for GARP, including Sub-programmes, that are considered essential prerequisites in defining the
scientific requirements of GARP (this will include defining detailed
experimental objectives and operational requirements for their implementation);
(b) To recommend to WMO those techniques and procedures developed in GARP programmes that may be applied in the operation of
WWW;
(c) To recommend to WMO the manner in which the scientific requirements of GARP can best be supported by the operation of WWW.
AGREE further:
(1) That the Joint Organizing Committee shall be constituted according to the following principles:
(a) It shall consist of not more than twelve scientists selected by
mutual agreement between WMO and ICSU; the composition of the
membership of the Joint Organizing Committee to be reviewed jointly
by the WMO and ICSU four years after the establishment of the Committee. The Committee will be convened, in the first instance, by a
Convenor designated by the Presidents of ICSU and WMO. A chairman will be elected by the Committee initially for a term of four years;
(b) It shall be regarded by both organizations as the main scientific organ for the consideration, endorsement and recommendations on
all proposals relating to GARP and its Sub-programmes;
(c) It shall be supported by both organizations as agreed;
(d) It shall be authorized to select and convene working groups,
special study groups, to select consultants, etc., within its field of responsibility, within the plans and budgets approved annually by the appropriate Committee of each organization and taking into account
existing technical and scientific groups in both organizations;'
(e) In pursuing its planning efforts it shall keep the relevant bodies
of ICSU and WMO fully informed of its activities, and it shall take full
and appropriate consideration of the expressed interests of such WMO
and ICSU bodies, including Technical Commissions and advisory bodies;
(f) It shall guide the activities of a small full-time Joint Planning
Staff;
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(g) It shall meet at least once annually.
(2) The detailed procedures specified in the annex to this agreement
shall be followed in the practical application of this agreement.
(3) The Joint Planning Staff for the Global Atmospheric Research
Programme should consist of personnel recommended by the Joint Organizing Committee and approved by WMO and ICSU, and should:
(a) Formulate, for the Joint GARP Organizing Committee and
in accordance with the scientific objectives established by it, detailed
plans for GARP, including GARP Sub-programmes;
(b) Provide secretarial assistance for the Joint GARP Organizing
Committee;
(c) Assist in the preparation of reports and supply information concerning GARP as directed by the Joint GARP Organizing Committee;
(d) Follow up the implementation of GARP, including GARP Subprogrammes, submitting to the Joint GARP Organizing Committee adequate information concerning the degree of fulfillment of the objectives,
within the approved plans.
(4) The Secretary-General of WMO shall be responsible for the administration of the finances and the provision of services for the Joint
Organizing Committee and Joint Planning Staff in accordance with
procedures approved by the Executive Committee of both WMO and
ICSU. He will consult the Treasurer of ICSU on any important questions that may arise.
EXPRESS THE VIEW that only by such a collaborative effort can
the GARP be successfully executed.
Signed at Rome, Italy
(Signed)
J. M. Harrison
(Signed)
Alf Nyberg
President
President
International Council of Scientific
World Meteorological
Unions
Organization
on the tenth day of October, 1967
Annex to the Agreement
Proceduresto be followed in implementing the Agreement
Decisions: All major decisions affecting the implementation of
GARP shall be taken jointly by the two organizations. Such decisions
may relate to pilot projects, preliminary experiments, the main programme and any other major form of activity which might foster the
common aim.
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Implementation of decisions: The methods of implementing such
decisions shall be agreed jointly. In some cases, implementation may
be on a joint basis (e.g. a joint conference); in others one or other of the
two organizations may, by mutual consent, accept sole responsibility.
In the case of joint projects, the procedures and methods adopted shall
conform to the basic constitutions of both organizations. If the implementation requires action by another body or organization, the request
will be submitted to that body by one or other of the organizations but
in the name of both. All proposals from the Joint Organizing Committee should clearly indicate the method of implementation recommended.

